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CHAPTER X 
 
SEVIMA SALI-TERZIĆ 
 
 
THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
1. Review of the Legal System in B-H 
 
1.1. Constitutional Framework 
 
The Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution was adopted in a way which was unusual 
in the constitutional practice within B-H: as a part of the internationally brokered Peace 
Agreement concluded in Dayton and signed in Paris.1  That is why it cannot be stated 
that the Constitution represents ‘an expression of the will of the people’, as it was not 
made by legitimate representatives within a legislative body. Nevertheless, by signing 
up to the Dayton Agreement as a whole, and thereby to its Annex 4, which is the State 
Constitution, B-H committed itself to implementing the constitutional wording.   
The first characteristic of the B-H Constitution is its stipulation that Bosnia-
Herzegovina ‘shall consist of the two Entities, the B-H Federation and Republika 
Srpska’.2 However, the state ‘umbrella’ was given very limited responsibilities, while 
numerous prerogatives normally restricted to a sovereign state remained within, or were 
assigned to, the Entities. The central authorities, under the Constitution, are the 
Presidency, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Ministers, Constitutional Court and the 
Central Bank. These institutions have responsibilities in the following matters: foreign 
policy, trade, monetary policies, immigration, refugees and asylum seekers, 
international and inter-entity criminal law enforcement, establishment and operation of 
common and international communication facilities, regulation of inter-entity 
transportation and air traffic control.3 All other matters which were not expressly given 
to the State fall within the responsibility of the Entities. Hence, the State has no 
responsibility for law enforcement authorities, armed forces or a central judicial system.   
What has very often been criticized in the B-H Constitution, and something 
which has limited effectively the fight against ultra-nationalist policies in B-H, is 
legitimized and ‘prescribed’ discrimination. Namely, the B-H Constitution does not 
recognize a ‘citizen’ as a constitutional category, but only ‘constituent peoples’ as the 
constituents of the B-H State. It does not give the national minorities a status which 
could be seen as ‘a constitutionally recognized category’. Rather, their existence is 
suggested through the category of ‘Others’. The legitimization of discrimination is 
reflected, first of all, in a passive voting right, since the B-H Constitution prescribes that 
the Presidency consists of one Bosniac and one Croat, both directly elected in the 
territory of the B-H Federation, and one Serb, directly elected in the territory of 
Republika Srpska.4 In practical terms, this means that a non-Bosniac/non-Croat from 
the B-H Federation and a non-Serb from Republika Srpska will never be able to run for 
                                           
1 The B-H Constitution is, in fact, Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement. For more information about the 
Agreement see: Chapter III, Dr. Zoran Pajić, The Role of Institutions in Peace Building (Rule of Law in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina).  
2 Article I 2 of the B-H Constitution 
3 Article III 1 and 2. 
4 Article V  
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the Presidential elections and/or be elected to the B-H Presidency, which directly runs 
counter to the ground-rules of fair and free elections.   
On the other side, there is no possibility for the entire body of citizens to elect 
the whole membership of the Presidency.  Rather, each voter may vote for one 
Presidency member, i.e. cast his or her vote in favor of one candidate only. That 
provision makes a dismantlement of nationalist authorities by way of a democratic 
procedure extremely difficult or impossible. Importantly, that situation has somewhat 
improved by the B-H Constitutional Court Decision on the Constituent Status of 
Peoples in the whole territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which stipulates that the 
constituent peoples are equal in the whole territory of B-H and that the Entity 
Constitutions must be brought into harmony with both the Decision and the B-H 
Constitution. To that effect, the High Representative for B-H has appointed 
Constitutional Commissions in both Entities which will propose changes and 
amendments to the Entity Constitutions in accordance with the B-H Constitutional Court 
Decision.   
It has often been asserted that amendment of the discriminatory constitutional 
provisions would, in fact, imply a revision of the Dayton Agreement. However, any 
questions raised to that end merely obfuscate the whole issue; for no matter how many 
constitutional provisions could be a subject for objection and criticism, the B-H 
Constitution contains a section which normally appears in any other constitution, 
providing both mechanisms and procedures for amending the Constitution.5 Therefore, 
it is indeed possible to amend the Constitution through parliamentary procedure and 
eliminate the legitimized discrimination, while the Dayton Agreement, itself, as an 
international document, will remain unchanged.   
 
 
1.2. The Legislative System 
 
At the level of the B-H State, the legislative authority is in the hands of the bi-
cameral Parliamentary Assembly. According to the Constitution, the House of 
Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly is comprised of 42 members: two thirds 
are elected from the territory of the B-H Federation and one third from the territory of 
Republika Srpska. The House of Peoples is comprised of 15 representatives: two thirds 
from the B-H Federation and one third from Republika Srpska.   
The Parliamentary Assembly has the responsibility for enacting legislation as 
necessary to implement decisions of the Presidency or to carry out the responsibilities 
of the Parliamentary Assembly; deciding upon the sources and amounts of revenues 
needed for operations of the B-H institutions, a budget for the B-H institutions, and 
deciding whether to consent to the ratification of treaties.   
Until the inauguration of the new Parliament, the uncompromising interests of 
the national/nationalist parties which were in power before the November 2000 
elections kept the Parliamentary Assembly mainly blocked.  For this reason most of the 
bills necessary for normal functioning of the State either were not made into law or 
were imposed by the High Representative’s decisions issued under the powers 
invested in him.   
In the B-H Federation, the legislative authority is the Parliament which has two 
Chambers: the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples. In Republika 
Srpska, the legislature is the National Assembly of Republika Srpska.   
                                           
5 Article X 
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As has already been stated earlier, the High Representative has broad powers 
which he may use in the civilian implementation of the Dayton Accords. His initial 
powers were subsequently broadened by the Peace Implementation Council. Very 
broad legislative powers were invested in the High Representative at the Peace 
Implementation Conference in Bonn on 10 December 1997. The purpose was to 
unblock the legislative bodies and act when the then-ruling national/nationalist parties 
were not able to reach an agreement on any issue. The Conclusions of the Bonn 
Peace Implementation Conference empowered the High Representative to issue final 
and binding decisions with a view to “resolving any difficulties, when the High 
Representative deems it necessary”, and, inter alia, “issuing interim measures which 
will become effective when the parties are unable to reach an agreement, which will 
remain in force until the Presidency or the Council of Ministers issues a decision on that 
issue, in compliance with the Peace Agreement”.6 The High Representative has used 
his powers on a number of occasions and issued decisions on, for example, common 
vehicle registration plates, the B-H flag and anthem, judicial and prosecutorial functions 
in the Federation and the RS, prohibition of deportation of victims of “white slavery”, 
pensions and so forth.   
Nevertheless, a feeling of frustration remains due to the lack of a developed 
strategy for applying legislative powers. As a consequence, no one knows which law or 
decision is to be given priority; while the legislative authorities fail to reach an 
agreement, the High Representative continues to use his authority. Furthermore, in 
drafting the laws to be imposed by the High Representative, little or insufficient 
consultation is held with domestic, independent legal experts7 whose knowledge about 
the domestic legal system and the needs of the B-H society vastly exceeds the 
information possessed by anyone from the outside. An illustrative example is the Draft 
Election Law. Although supported fully by all major actors of the international 
community operating in B-H, it was rejected on two different occasions almost 
unanimously by the country’s legal experts, by most of the political and the majority of 
civil society representatives (the Draft Law was made under the supervision of the 
OSCE and was supported by the OHR, Council of Europe and UNMIBH). The Draft 
Law was criticized mainly because it legitimized discrimination which this Chapter has 
already discussed.  It particularly provided for the discrimination in electing the 
members of the Presidency by limiting the right to be elected. After the Draft Law was 
rejected by the Parliamentary Assembly, the High Representative chose not to impose 
it – which was a very good decision. The Draft Law was returned for revision. However, 
even after revision, the same discriminatory provisions have remained, which is the 
major reason why it has never been passed.   
 
 
1.3. The Judicial System 
 
                                           
6 Bonn Peace Implementation Conference 1997, Bosnia-Herzegovina 1998: Self-sustaining Structures, 
Conclusions, Bonn, 10 December 1997. 
7 Examples: Draft Election Law, Draft Defamation Legislation, Law on Access to Information in B-H or 
Draft Law on B-H Associations and Foundations. The texts of these laws were made in English and 
translated into the B-H official languages. Further, the technique used in making these laws reveals a 
strong influence of international schools of law and they are often a result of involvement of legal experts 
from 'common law' system. Although there is no doubt about good intentions, the legal community here 
often interprets that as an intrusion into the country’s legal system, which may have a negative impact in 
the long run. 
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Although it was made under the auspices of the international community and 
primarily of US diplomacy, the B-H Constitution does not provide any rules for the third 
branch of the government – the judiciary. As a consequence, no judicial control is 
exercised over the other two branches of the government. The only court at the level of 
the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the B-H Constitutional Court.8   
Under the terms of Annex 6 to the Dayton Agreement covering the area of 
human rights, the B-H Commission for Human Rights was established and is composed 
of the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights and the Human Rights Chamber.9 
The latter has the power to handle grievances by receiving applications concerning 
alleged violations of human rights only if all other domestic legal remedies have been 
exhausted; it also issues final and binding decisions which the Parties are obliged to 
implement.10   
In regard to the Constitutional Court11 competencies for human rights issues 
under the State Constitution, the implementation of the Court responsibilities proved 
very soon to be overlapping those of the Human Rights Chamber.  At the request of the 
Office of the High Representative, this issue was considered by the European 
Commission for Democracy Through Law (known as the Venice Commission). The 
Commission made a Preliminary Proposal for the restructuring of the human rights 
protection mechanisms in Bosnia-Herzegovina12. This document also proposes a 
merger of the Human Rights Chamber with the B-H Constitutional Court.  Two reasons 
were given: first, the partial overlapping between the competencies of those two 
institutions is likely to become a factor of “dysfunctioning of human rights adjudication 
in the country”, while the second is that the Human Rights Chamber is a “transitional sui 
generis (quasi-international) institution, the establishment of which was requested by 
Annex 6 to the Dayton Peace Agreement, pending the accession of Bosnia-
Herzegovina to the Council of Europe and ratification of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). The Chamber should, thus, cease its operation after the 
ratification of the ECHR and the subjection of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the control 
mechanism of this instrument, namely, the European Court of Human Rights”. The 
Venice Commission Conclusions from 31 March – 1 April 2000 make further 
recommendations, among which the most important is that the competence for final 
human rights protection must be given to a single body at the level of the State, which 
is likely to be achieved by a merger of the Human Rights Chamber with the B-H 
Constitutional Court. However, the merger should not take place before the ratification 
of the ECHR. It was further recommended that, inter alia, the Parliamentary Assembly 
should adopt an organic law (on the Constitutional Court), including detailed 
recommendations for the matters to be covered by that law. Pending the ratification of 
the ECHR and the adoption of necessary laws and regulations proposed by the Venice 
Commission, those two institutions should continue to operate in parallel, regardless of 
the problem concerning ‘forum shopping’ whereby persons are able to choose between 
seeking protection from the Chamber or the Constitutional Court. 
                                           
8 B-H Constitutional Court has 6 domestic and 3 international judges. Of that number, 4 judges are elected 
by the B-H Federation House of Representatives, 2 are elected by the RS National Assembly, and 3 
international judges are elected by the President of the European Court for Human Rights, following 
consultations with the Presidency. 
9 Annex 6 to the Dayton Agreement: Agreement on Human Rights, Chapter II, Part A, Article II 1 
10 Ibid., Part C, Article VIII and IX 
11 Annex 4: B-H Constitution, Article VI 3c 
12 CDL-INF (99) 12 
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 At the Entity level, the judicial authority is organized in the following manner: 
 
a) B-H Federation: municipal courts, cantonal courts, B-H Federation Supreme Court 
and the B-H Federation Constitutional Court; 
b) Republika Srpska: municipal courts, district courts, RS Supreme Court and RS 
Constitutional Court.  
 
 
1.4. International Legal Standards and Domestic Legal Tradition 
 
As has already been said, the legal framework for the protection of human rights 
is provided by the B-H and the Federation (FB-H) Constitutions in a manner which is 
seen as unusual. The B-H Constitution prescribes that the rights and freedoms set forth 
in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Protocols thereto ‘shall be 
applied directly in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These acts shall have priority over all other 
laws’13, and that B-H and all of its bodies, institutions ‘and authorities operated directly 
by or within the Entities’ are obliged to apply the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms enshrined in the European Convention14.  Further, fifteen Human Rights 
Agreements to be applied in Bosnia-Herzegovina are listed in Annex I to the B-H 
Constitution.  However, it remains unclear whether they will be applied in the manner 
envisaged for the application of the European Convention, although Article II, 
paragraph 4 prescribes that the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms provided for in 
the B-H Constitution or the international agreements listed in Annex I to the Constitution 
will be secured to all persons without discrimination on any ground.   
In practice, those provisions mean that the courts of law and other bodies are 
obliged to apply the European Convention directly. In view of its priority over any other 
law under the Constitution, in case a law is in contravention of the European 
Convention, the court and other bodies will apply such law in a manner which conforms 
to the European Convention15. However, despite numerous training programs for 
judges, prosecutors and legal professionals on the application of the law set forth in the 
European Convention and other international agreements and treaties16, there is only a 
limited number of cases in which regular courts of law have applied directly or called 
upon the European Convention or any other international agreement. It is mainly the 
Human Rights Chamber and the Office of the Ombudsman that rely on international 
law standards. 
As many as 27 international human rights protection instruments have become 
constitutional provisions of the B-H Federation Constitution, while by amendment one 
more document is included – the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities. The legal status of those instruments is even more unusual. Namely, 
although all of those agreements are inserted entirely in the B-H Federation 
Constitution and have become applicable internal law, some of them contain provisions 
the implementation of which is not possible in B-H on the grounds of their procedural 
character. Amongst those instruments is, for instance, the European Social Charter, 
under which the States-Contracting Parties may, at the time when the instrument of 
                                           
13 B-H Constitution, Article II 2 
14 Ibid., Article II 6 
15 For example, although B-H Federation and RS Criminal Codes prescribed a death sentence, it could not 
be pronounced any longer after the B-H Constitution came into force, as it would be in direct contravention 
of the First Protocol to the European Convention which forbids a death penalty. 
16 Programmes of the International Human Rights Law, Council of Europe, etc. 
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ratification of the Contracting Party concerned is deposited, select Articles of the 
Charter by which they will be bound – the selection of Articles is done in accordance 
with the relevant paragraphs of the Charter. The reason for this possibility is to allow 
the States to make their own assessment of what is feasible in terms of their 
economies, without committing themselves to responsibilities they will not be able to 
fulfil. However, the entire Charter is incorporated in the B-H Federation Constitution, 
thereby imposing on the economically impoverished B-H Federation additional financial 
liabilities. On the other hand, while the guarantees of the highest social standards are 
welcome, a logical question remains as to whether that form of protection of the rights 
is effective if the social standards are to remain on paper, non-materialized. According 
to information from the B-H Federation Constitutional Court, this Court has not received 
a single request for evaluation of constitutionality of a law or a piece of legislation in 
reference to one of the instruments incorporated in the local Constitutions. This fact 
confirms an insufficient practice in applying international legal standards in the 
domestic judicial system. 
 
 
2. International Support to Judicial Reform in B-H 
 
2.1. Stakeholders and Programs for Legal and Judicial Reform 
 
The necessity of having an independent judiciary and building the rule of law 
were issues of the highest priority for most international organizations and agencies 
sent on a mission to B-H or implementing various programs here. The importance 
attached to an impartial and independent judiciary and elimination of any political 
interference is reinforced by the Council of Europe’s accession requirement.17 
Various organizations developed manifold approaches to the manner in which 
these goals could be achieved. Some of the organizations, having focused on 
institution building programs, worked directly on the establishment of the B-H 
Federation Constitutional and Supreme Courts18. Others focused on the training 
programs for judges, prosecutors and legal professionals on human rights and any 
other issues relevant for the judicial and prosecutorial service.19 Others chose to 
monitor the judicial system and facilitate the restructuring of judicial system institutional 
structures20. For the needs of this Study we shall provide a review of the activities done 
by two of the major stakeholders in, inter alia, the area of judicial reform and the results 
achieved in that process: the activities of the Office of the High Representative and 
those of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.   
 
 
2.1.1. Office of the High Representative (OHR) 
 
The Peace Implementation Council’s Bonn Conference21 concluded that ‘an 
impartial and independent judiciary is essential for the rule of law and reconciliation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’. It also pointed out that the process of appointment of judges 
                                           
17 See Chapter III for more details on the situation in the B-H judiciary, supra note 1 
18 For example, American Bar Association – Central and East European Law Initiative 
19 International Human Rights Law Group, Council of Europe, OSCE, UN etc. 
20 OHR, OSCE, UNMIBH, Council of Europe 
21 supra note 6 
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should be changed so as to ensure an impartial election, without any political 
interference, and the necessity to continue judicial training. A special importance was 
attached to criminal legislation reform in both Entities. In that same document, the PIC 
requested the establishment of a Commission for Inter-Entity Judicial Co-operation 
which was to become operational no later than 31 January 1998.  The purpose of the 
Commission was to strengthen co-operation and consistency between the Entities in 
the area of judicial reform. The Office of the High Representative was empowered to 
co-ordinate various programs for legal and judicial reforms within a ‘coherent and 
focused program including the harmonization of criminal codes and the criminal 
procedure codes in both Entities with the B-H Constitution’. The Office of the High 
Representative urged the Council of Europe, OSCE and UNMIBH to establish co-
operation within the judicial and legal reform program and requested particularly from 
the United Nations Mission to establish a Task Force within UNMIBH which would focus 
on the evaluation and monitoring of the judicial system. 
By its Madrid Declaration 22, the PIC reiterated, inter alia, the need for an 
independent, impartial and multiethnic judiciary and also the establishment of judicial 
institutions at the State level, in accordance with the Venice Commission opinion.   
In pursuance of the set tasks and responsibilities, OHR established a Judicial 
Reform Unit within OHR’s Human Rights and Rule of Law Department. The Unit was 
entrusted with the implementation of the Judicial Reform Program.23 This program 
started from the fact that the problems in the judicial system were not of legal, but 
rather of administrative or economic nature, which required appropriate activities. It was 
also stressed that judicial reform was possible only through a shared effort by the 
judiciary itself - ‘internal’ effort – and by politicians and the public – ‘external’ effort.24 
The OHR decided that the ‘political’ dimension of the judicial reform should be 
twofold. Firstly, it would launch activities towards  ‘the establishment of a political 
constituent for judicial reform’ 25 and secondly, it would facilitate ‘that the legal system 
should become a vehicle of political changes’.26   
Within judicial reform, OHR set a goal of amending the principles under which 
the judiciary was to be organized and managed. The first step to achieve that was the 
adoption of appropriate laws on courts and prosecutor’s offices. Although this goal was 
set as a priority in 1998, the Federation Parliament had not adopted such law even two 
years later. In the year 2000, the High Representative concluded that the wait-and-see 
policy could no longer be tolerated and on 17 May 2000 imposed the B-H Federation 
Law on Judicial and Prosecutorial Service. The Law provides for the ‘establishment of 
independent Federation and Cantonal judicial and prosecutorial commissions which will 
make recommendations to the parliaments for judicial and prosecutorial appointments 
and disciplinary action.’ 27   
In Republika Srpska, although the domestic authorities, i.e. the RS National 
Assembly, took action towards removing the direct influence of executive and 
legislative authorities on the judiciary and prosecution, ‘the amendments adopted by 
                                           
22 16 December 1998 
23 See: http://www.ohr.int/humanrights/jrp.htm 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 OHR, Press Release: Federation Law on Judicial and Prosecutorial Service, Sarajevo, 18 May 2000, 
source: http://www.ohr.int/press/p20000518b.htm. In the pursuance of this Law the Federation Judicial 
Commission and Federation Prosecutorial Commission and Cantonal Commissions for the Election of 
Judges (10) and Prosecutors (10) were established. 
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the RS National Assembly at the last moment undermined the purpose of the Laws’.28  
The said amendments secured the RS Minister of Justice’s membership in the judiciary 
management body – the RS High Judicial Council. However, the High Representative 
imposed amendments which changed the disputed provisions, thereby excluding the 
RS Minister of Justice from the Council and giving responsibility for the management of 
the Council to the RS Supreme Court, as was the case in the B-H Federation. 
Concerning institution building and related reform, in essence this meant the 
provision of funds and sources to the courts and prosecutor’s offices necessary for 
their services. The OHR defined its own task ‘to identify the areas in judiciary and 
prosecution which require capacity-building efforts and to assist donors in extending 
support in an efficient and timely manner’.29 OHR assessed that, inter alia, the following 
activities were of extreme importance: implementation of laws in both Entities which 
regulate the issue of the election of judges; advanced training of judges and 
prosecutors; both judicial and prosecutorial salaries; formation and strengthening of the 
Institute for Training of Judges and Prosecutors; strengthening of the prosecutorial role 
in the process of investigation; ‘restore and expand the suspended Commission on 
Inter-Entity Legal Co-operation'; reform of the prison system; reform of the Schools of 
Law curricula; dissemination of information to the public about the judicial system, 
pending reforms and their legal rights; etc.   
In addition, on 14 March 2001 the High Representative issued a Decision 
providing the Independent Judicial Commission (IJC) with a comprehensive mandate. 
The High Representative established the IJC in November 2000, following the closure 
of the UN JSAP. Its establishment was based on the Brussels May 2000 Conclusions 
of the Peace Implementation Council, which requested the formation of an 
‘international supervisory body for judicial reform, which ‘should act as a single, 
consolidated body which would work on judicial reform in B-H’.30 The IJC is mandated 
to carry out the judicial reform and promote the rule of law by way of monitoring and 
assessing the judiciary and the work of the Entity and Cantonal Commissions and 
Councils established for the purpose of reviewing the work of incumbent judges and 
prosecutors and selecting new ones. IJC is also tasked with ‘providing assistance and 
guidance to domestic agencies, including the judicial and prosecutorial commissions 
and enforcing high standards of ethics and professionalism. It will also oversee 
domestic training bodies and act as a focal point for international and domestic 
initiatives for judicial reform.’31  IJC will also advise the High Representative on all 
issues from the IJC’s mandate and make recommendations for the ‘use of his powers 
under the Dayton Peace Agreement, if necessary’.32 IJC may also step into the work of 
the commissions and review councils and suspend a procedure, leading to a final High 
Representative’s decision. And finally, IJC is authorized to have access to information 
‘available to judges, prosecutors, relevant ministries and commissions and the 
judicial/prosecutorial review councils.’33   
                                           
28 OHR, Press Release: Amendments to the Law on Judicial Reform in Republika Srpska, Sarajevo, 12 
June 2000, source: http://ohr.int/press/p20000612c.htm In pursuance of this Law, the High Judicial Council 
and the High Prosecutorial Council were formed. 
29 supra note 21 
30 OHR, Press Release: High Representative gives the Independent Judicial Commission a Comprehensive 
Mandate, 14 March 2001. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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The IJC director and deputy director are internationals, while the staff consists 
of international and local legal professionals.34 
 
 
2.1.2. UNMIBH 
 
In responding to the requests of the Bonn Conference and Madrid Declaration, 
the UN Security Council established by its Resolution No. 1184 of 16 July 1998 the 
Judicial System Assessment Program (JSAP) which began to work by the end of that 
same year. This part of the UN Mission in B-H monitored and evaluated the judicial 
system in B-H within a comprehensive OHR-assisted legal reform program. JSAP’s 
teams were made up of local and international legal professionals who worked 
throughout B-H. The program ended in November 2000 when the OHR took over the 
above responsibilities. (According to some unofficial information, the transfer was done 
under the pressure of the United States, which had conditioned the funding of the UN 
activities in B-H with the abolishment of that particular program, as judicial monitoring 
was not a UN mandate. 
According to the November 2000 Report35, after it had taken stock of the 
situation in the local judiciary during its first year of operation, the JSAP aimed at 
applying its own expertise in the judicial review process. Thus, UNMIBH proposed that 
JSAP “should help monitoring and assessment of, and advice to, the Federation 
Commission and the High Council’. At the same time the High Representative said that 
‘his Office was expecting JSAP to take the lead in the implementation of the laws 
pertaining to the election of judges once the laws were in place’. To that effect, by the 
end of January 2000, UN approved five more positions within JSAP for the purpose of 
executing that task. In February 2000, a Judicial Review Team (JRT) was established 
within JSAP; it consisted of a Polish judge, one American legal practitioner, two 
Norwegian judges, one Finnish judge and another American legal expert. The JRT 
played an important role in drafting the amendments to the Law on Courts and Judicial 
Service and the Law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office in the RS, as well as the Law on 
Judicial and Prosecutorial Service, eventually imposed by the High Representative. 
 
 
2.2. Judicial and legal reform: partnership or paternalism? 
 
The international community’s engagement in B-H has contributed significantly 
to the gradual stabilization of the situation in the post-war period. Very often a whole 
range of issues were addressed and breakthroughs were made, thanks to the 
involvement of various international organizations and agencies, specifically those 
which were empowered directly by the Dayton Agreement to materialize the Peace 
settlement. The political process was very often blocked by obstruction made by 
national/nationalist parties which refused to make any compromises or allow any 
progress, in their attempt to maintain their limitless powers in a situation of frustration 
and recession, rather than progress. In such a situation the actions taken by the 
international community were more than positive, representing the only light shining out 
of the dark reality.   
                                           
34 According to the information received verbally, the internationals are the majority, although the intention 
is to transfer the Commission to the country’s legal professionals. 
35 Thematic Report VII: JSAP and the Judicial Review Process in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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In parallel, their engagement was facilitated by B-H’s being in the focus of many 
donors who did not hesitate to direct their funds to a variety of programs identified in 
B-H as a priority. This is true for all aspects of life in B-H, including the legal and judicial 
system. Since the very beginning of the Dayton peace implementation and the initial 
announcements of the possibility of B-H’s accession to the Council of Europe, it was 
continually stressed that the accession of B-H to the European family of nations would 
be possible after this country had adopted a set of laws and built an independent and 
impartial judiciary.   
The international community, notably the OHR, UNMIBH, OSCE, the Council of 
Europe, and also numerous international non-governmental organizations, devised 
various approaches and programs with the aim to accomplish those goals. This was 
mainly training programs for legal professionals, judges and prosecutors and also 
effective activities at the legislative level, with a view to improving the legal framework 
and establishing an independent judiciary.   
 
Nevertheless, some oversights did occur and called in question the 
achievement of the results set by the international community. Namely, local legal 
experts, and especially judges and prosecutors, had an impression that the programs 
attacked them for being incompetent in the job they did. That was why the training 
programs, which were indeed well-intentioned, were sometimes met with resistance 
against the international organizations involved, rather than with a strong wish to co-
operate. Thus, an Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors: Justice, 
Accountability and Social Reconstruction36, notably its section explaining attitudes of 
legal practitioners, judges and prosecutors in B-H towards the international community, 
reads as follows: 
 
Participants expressed mixed reactions to the legal training for judges and 
prosecutors provided by international organizations. Many reported that the 
training programs were not well-planned, that those conducting sessions were 
not familiar with Bosnian legal structures and that the training covered too many 
topics in a limited time…. Some reported that international seminars were not 
particularly relevant to their work because the trainers and attendees frequently 
came from different legal systems. 
.... 
Participants expressed criticism of international organizations operating within 
Bosnia. Opinions varied toward international organizations such as OHR, United 
Nations and the ICTY, as well as international non-governmental organizations. 
Participants frequently commented that the representatives of international 
organizations lacked knowledge about Bosnia and seemed unprepared and 
uncommitted.37 
 
Negative reactions by judges and prosecutors were provoked also by the 
international monitoring of the Bosnian judicial system and court procedures, the task 
which was highly prioritized by the international organizations involved. The Study 
reads as follows: 
 
                                           
36 The Study was produced by Human Rights Centre, International Human Rights Law Clinic, California 
University, Berkley and Human Rights Centre, Sarajevo University, May 2000. 
37 Page 18 
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...One participant described international monitors as people without ‘good 
wishes’ who were only interested in living in a foreign country for a while. 
Another experienced as personally adversarial the comments of an international 
monitor who also was a judge. ‘He wanted to irritate me’. This same judge 
described his other experiences with international visitors to his courtroom as 
pointless ‘because all trials in Bosnia are public. I was curious why they came. It 
is of little value’.38 
 
At the same time some of the highest international officials expressed criticism 
which went to such lengths as to characterize the Bosnian judiciary as corrupt. The first 
such statement was made by Mrs. Elisabeth Rehn, UN Special Representative in B-H, 
in July 1999. The Study reports on how her statement was received within legal and 
judicial circles: 
 
...These judges felt that Rehn’s blanket criticism unfairly damaged the credibility 
of the judiciary. Mrs. Rehn openly said that the courts are corrupt. I do not think 
that she talks for nothing. But it would be good if she could offer concrete 
evidence. There are many good judges who are far from that categorization. 
The other judge asserted that such comments put ‘an enormous burden on all 
judges’ since the judicial system was unable to initiate removal proceedings 
without allegations against specific judges, and thus the accusations 
encouraged those dissatisfied with a court judgement to claim it was the result 
of corruption.39 
 
The Study states further: 
 
Further, the participants reported anger and confusion over the criticism by 
international lawyers who did not appear to understand the legal tradition of civil 
law countries, or, if they did, were perceived as showing disrespect for the 
judicial system to which Bosnian legal professionals were devoted. These 
attitudes, coupled with the decision of the ICTY to combine common law and 
civil law, to the great confusion of our participants, may lead to a pervasive 
sense of being practitioners in a second rate system. Judges and prosecutors 
therefore find themselves on the defensive, powerless in the face of an 
international community that rejects their beliefs. … Unfortunately, participants 
perceived international criticism of the Bosnian legal system as an attack on 
their professional identity. This perception by participants indicates that efforts 
by international organizations to enhance the professionalism of Bosnian judges 
and prosecutors should be designed with this vulnerability in mind....40 
 
Further, although a legal framework is in place now, which is meant to eliminate 
fully political influence and pressures on the judiciary, judges and prosecutors still feel 
themselves to be under pressure both by criminal elements and the international 
community, particularly after the adoption of the new Entity laws which envisage and 
request the review of all judges within a defined period of time. Many specifically 
expressed relief that these laws were eventually imposed and that judges and 
                                           
38 Page 19 
39 Page 20 
40 Page 38, also see Chapter III for more information on the B-H legal tradition, supra nota 1 
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prosecutors were finally granted decent salaries, as well as with the fact that possible 
political interference with the judicial election and appointment procedure was 
eliminated. Still, they felt rather frustrated by the fact that their work would be examined 
and reviewed, supervised by the international community, allowing for the possibility 
that the High Representative could use his powers, ending in removals.   
The judicial and prosecutorial removal procedure is regulated by the laws which 
were imposed in both Entities by the High Representative. Although a final decision is 
to be made by the authorities established by these laws, IJC may exert a significant 
influence and use its own broad powers. This issue has already been discussed above. 
While this was not an ultimate intention at all, the judges feel an additional pressure 
which makes them rather discouraged.  
Thus, the good will of the international community to help reform the legal and 
judicial system is obvious.  It should be recognized that judges and other legal 
professionals remain open to those changes. What is the problem then? It is obvious 
that too often there is a disparity between international and local powers, which effects 
adversely the evolution process. Various priorities are defined and implemented without 
sufficient consultation with those on whom a successful reform truly depends. That is 
the reason why the B-H legal professionals, judges and prosecutors believe that the 
international community is imposing foreign values and solutions which would be much 
better if there were more co-operation and partnership involved.   
This largely refers to legislative reform as well. Many perceived it as ‘an 
unwelcome intrusion into the country’s legal system’. The Study reads as follows:  
 
...One participant stated that he would prefer that the international community 
focus on assisting Bosnia in creating its own institutions rather than intervening 
in routine matters. Another reported that the representatives of the international 
community within Bosnia lacked knowledge of, and respect for, the Bosnian 
legal system and he complained that he had to spend ‘half my time explaining 
basic laws and rules we apply here, which is sometimes a nuisance’.   
 
In particular, participants expressed positive and negative attitudes toward OHR. 
Some viewed it as a thoroughly political institution and expressed frustration 
with the OHR’s changing of the laws. Nevertheless, many felt that OHR ensured 
political stability. One participant, who criticized certain OHR actions, also noted 
that without it “we would still be arguing about the size of the letters on 
passports”....’41 
 
The fact is that the drafting of the laws under the auspices of the OSCE or OHR 
involves mainly foreign experts, while the involvement of domestic legal experts is 
minimal or quite limited. Examples which could serve for illustration are the Law on 
Access to Information (enacted), the Defamation Legislation and the Law on 
Associations and Foundations in B-H (draft). It would become clear to any legal 
professional in Bosnia, even at first sight, that the laws were not originally drafted in the 
local language, but that they were a translation from the English text, which provides 
sufficient ground to assume who had the last say in the drafting of the laws. Further, a 
new structure and technique are often promoted. As they differ a lot from the legal 
tradition in B-H, this practice does indeed contribute to resistance among the legal 
community in B-H.  It is often believed that domestic legal experts are used as a 
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‘screen’ for the international community, while the local influence on the wording of the 
laws is minimal or none.  One of the most recent examples is the Defamation 
Legislation, which can hardly be understood even by experienced legal practitioners, let 
alone citizens and others who will be expected to abide by its wording once it has been 
enacted in the parliamentary procedure. Some legal experts complain that the object of 
protection is unclear to them, as it seems to them that the legislation protects mainly 
those who ‘commit defamation, slander or libel, but not those slandered’. OSCE is 
conducting public consultative meetings at which the OSCE internationals make 
presentations, while little or no attention is given to a profound exchange of opinion 
with judges and prosecutors who attend those forums.42 Another example is the Law on 
Associations and Foundations in B-H, which was made under the auspices of the OHR, 
and rendered rather poorly in the B-H official languages. This Law has already been 
presented to the B-H Parliamentary Assembly, without prior consultations with those 
whose work is regulated by that law – non-governmental organizations and other 
groups within the civil society sector. Most of these view the Law as restrictive and 
inappropriate to the civil sector development. 
Whilst there is good will on the part of the international community and an ample 
understanding of the local practitioners of the need to restructure and reform the 
country’s legal and judicial system, ‘the wires seem to have crossed’ between the 
international and legal communities in B-H.  It also becomes clear that even after five 
years of quite intensive activities and programs aimed at reforming those systems, 
notwithstanding the funds spent on their implementation and international experts, the 
achieved results do not correspond to invested efforts and funds. We could only guess 
the amount of funds invested. But one thing remains certain: they are not negligibly 
small, particularly when we take into account the number of international experts 
working on various programs and in numerous commissions, who are either 
permanently employed by an international organization or agency or came here ad hoc 
to stay for a while and work on a particular program. The same could be said of 
numerous monitors, ranging across the whole spectrum – including those who monitor 
elections every year and those who monitor judicial proceedings.   
Likewise, the lack of knowledge about the Bosnian legal system and tradition, 
the ‘civil law’ system and a unilateral imposition of one’s own values to implement ‘a 
modern’ legal system could not, in itself, yield positive results.   
It should, of course, be admitted that the political climate which has prevailed in 
B-H for years is not conducive to the real reforms. The politicians who tried hard to 
remain in power at any cost, corrupt and arrogant, did not show any wish for, or interest 
in, real reforms which could have been implemented by the local potential and 
expertise. The legal community in B-H, on the other hand, like any other, was entirely 
unprepared for the huge amounts of international assistance it received, and did not 
have its own goals and strategies which it could have been offered or requested that 
they be supported. Requests were made in reference to the poor financial situation in 
the judiciary, inadequate equipment, lack of funds, low salaries of judges and 
prosecutors and so forth.  No significant proposals or requests were made toward 
substantial reforms or the setting of their own priorities, which the donor community 
could support and in accordance with which the directing of assistance could have 
been sought. That was why the international community did not see the legal 
community in B-H as its partner in the true sense of the word. Rather, it assumed a 
                                           
42 Impressions of judges and prosecutors presented in informal discussions. 
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paternalistic attitude which continues to deepen frustrations and mutual lack of 
understanding.      
  
 
3. What Has and What Has Not Been Achieved? 
 
3.1. Institutions 
 
Great progress has undoubtedly been made in the development of institutions 
and their modernization, specifically through state-of-the-art information technologies. 
Nevertheless, it should be stated also that the domestic authorities began very quickly 
to contribute to this kind of modernization of the judicial institution infrastructure. They 
have not, however, yet taken over full responsibility for some of the so-called Dayton 
institutions, such as, for instance, the Human Rights Chamber and the Office of the 
Ombudsmen in B-H, which continue to be funded by donated monies.   
Another good example can be found in the efforts made towards the 
establishment of judicial authority at the State level, in conformity with the Venice 
Commission’s recommendations. Sadly, obstruction came mainly from “inside”, 
although this is one of the examples in which the international community is making a 
significant contribution to the strengthening of the state, or the so-called common 
institutions.   
Also, the international community enabled and ensured the establishment and 
unimpeded functioning of the B-H Constitutional Court and the B-H Federation 
Constitutional Court. Without external assistance, it is a question when and if these 
institutions would have become fully operational.   
On the other hand, one of the priorities of the OHR Judicial Reform Program – 
the establishment of the State-level Judicial Training Institute – has not been 
implemented. Although the activities began almost three years ago, involving different 
international experts, and although preparations must have cost a lot, there has still 
been no step forward.  
In addition, although the international organizations helped in the formation of 
some legal associations (of judges and prosecutors in general), no attention has been 
paid to their strengthening, in order to turn them into a real representative of the legal 
profession, capable of bringing forth the needs of the legal community.  In particular, 
the legal practice has been ignored, although it also needs a thorough reform which will 
turn the bar chambers into organizations able to respond to the needs of its members, 
profession and the public in general.   
 
 
3.2. Judicial system 
 
It has already been stressed that an independent and impartial judiciary was put 
high on the international community’s agenda and set as one of the accession 
requirements. The fact is that the laws imposed by the High Representative provide a 
legal framework which ensures elimination of any political influence on the judicial 
system. Nevertheless, the international community may influence the decisions on 
removal of judges through a review procedure, set forth in these laws, including the 
supervision by, and significant powers of, IJC. On those grounds the question may 
objectively be posed as to the magnitude of independence of the judiciary from any 
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external influence, under the international standards for an independent judiciary. 
There is still a possibility for the relationship between IJC and local commissions and 
judicial and prosecutorial review commissions to be established and further developed 
in such a manner which would rely on co-operation and understanding, and which 
would not call in question one of the basic standards of an independent judiciary – 
elimination of any external influence on the judiciary, where ‘external’ refers to 
everyone outside the judicial authority. Particularly, if that someone has the authority to 
remove judges and prosecutors on his own, or suspend procedures conducted before 
commissions and councils or otherwise make final decisions on what the judicial 
authority should be deciding upon independently and without anyone’s influence. For 
the purpose of strengthening and developing confidence among judges and 
prosecutors, and citizens too, it would be necessary to develop a partnership 
relationship between IJC and the commissions and councils, rather than relations 
based on powers and authorities. 
While much credit goes to numerous efforts towards training of legal 
practitioners, judges and prosecutors in the field of international legal standards, etc., 
much better results would have been achieved if the programs had been planned in co-
operation with the B-H legal community and with respect for the integrity of the Bosnian 
legal tradition. A continued emphasis on the need for a comprehensive reform of the 
B-H legal system, without a clear explanation of the new legal standards to be 
introduced into the country’s legal system, does not lead to an efficient dialogue and 
partnership. Instead, it provokes resistance and frustration, since it is viewed as non-
respect for the country’s expertise and experience and as an imposition of solutions by 
use of powers vested in the international community in B-H.   
It should be stressed, however, that although often criticized, the training 
programs served the purpose of what we call ‘reconciliation’ or which might be termed 
more precisely as ‘the re-establishment of broken ties’. The training programs were 
viewed by many judges and prosecutors as an opportunity to renew contacts with 
colleagues across ‘boundary lines’ and restore mutual trust and co-operation.43   
 
 
3.3. Legal framework 
 
The same could be said for the establishing of a new legal framework which 
would ensure a smooth transition to democracy. The reform of legal and judicial 
systems must and may only take place within a broader context of political reform. It is 
often felt that there is a lack of a carefully planned legal reform strategy on the part of 
the international community and also a passive attitude in the country’s legal 
community. Naturally, partnership should be established in this aspect as well, for a 
sheer imposition of international standards, without a real understanding of the 
country’s legal system, its evolution and potential, represents an act of disempowering 
of the country’s forces that are capable of implementing such reforms more efficiently 
than anyone else. On the other hand, a blanket criticism, without offering any solutions 
or defining the country’s priorities, constitutes no sound basis for an efficient dialogue 
with the international community.   
The international community and some of its representatives are often seen as 
a group aiming strongly to achieve their own grand results. That impression is based 
upon the imposed solutions which obviously lack a positive echo in the public or within 
                                           
43 IHRLG, ABA/CEELI, Council of Europe etc. report on this.  
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professional circles. An example is the Election Law which has continually been 
‘pushed’ in a manner which is found unacceptable by most people. Those who are 
persistently trying to advocate mightily the need for elimination of discrimination in all 
aspects of life, on any given basis, and full respect for the rights enshrined in the 
European Convention and other international instruments on human rights, are also 
trying to impose indirectly an Election Law which would legitimise discrimination and 
which is unacceptable to most of the citizens, legal professionals and politicians. In 
particular, this becomes evident in a situation in which the B-H Constitutional Court’s 
Decision on the constituent status of all three peoples throughout B-H is in place, 
requiring its implementation throughout the entire country, and in which Constitutional 
Commissions have been formed to propose constitutional amendments. It is obvious 
that the Election Law, if adopted in its proposed version, would be amended after the 
constitutional changes, which, in turn, would involve a costly mechanism and 
procedure. Unfortunately, disagreements with international proposals are often 
interpreted as ‘blocking of the process’ or ‘the lack of will to bring B-H into Europe’ 44, 
which is yet another form of pressure.   
 
 
4. Recommendations 
 
4.1.  The priorities and strategies for international assistance to the legal and judicial 
system should be defined exclusively in close co-operation between international 
stakeholders and the country’s legal community, in order to achieve results which would 
correspond to the investments. This should be the responsibility of the leading 
international organisations and agencies and the country’s legal community.   
 
4.2.  It is necessary to develop partnership in the implementation of established 
priorities in full respect for the country’s legal tradition, expertise and experience, and 
also to apply international legal standards in the B-H legal system and adapt the local 
system to those standards.   
 
4.3.  It will be possible to establish an independent judiciary only in close co-
operation with the judicial authorities and in full respect for the dignity and integrity of 
the judicial and prosecutorial officials. The promotion of independence and 
depoliticisation of the judiciary should not be done in a manner which calls in question 
that independence or leaves the impression of a judiciary dependence on the 
international community. Thus, all principles of judicial independence must be applied 
equally to those domestic authorities which could exert inappropriate pressures on the 
judiciary and to the international community which often has broad powers and 
authority.   
 
4.4.  The training programmes intended for the legal communities should be 
conducted by international professionals who possess a good knowledge of the 
country’s legal system and tradition. It is also necessary to work towards training local 
legal experts who can eventually take over the training programmes.   
 
                                           
44 Dnevni avaz, 7 April 2001, statement by Ambassador R. Barry and Luke Zahner, OSCE Spokesperson, 
on the failure of the Council of Ministers to reach a consensus on the Draft Election Law. 
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4.5.  The legislative reform process should be implemented in close co-operation with 
the country’s independent experts and also with professional legal associations whose 
experience and knowledge of the needs could contribute much to the defining of 
priorities in legislative reform and responding to the needs of citizens and the society in 
general.   
 
4.6.  In amending or making new laws, no solutions should be inserted which are 
alien to the B-H legal system or which could cause, in the long run, detrimental 
consequences for the functioning of the system solely on the grounds of their being 
‘implanted’. A combination of ‘common law’ and ‘civil law’ traditions could easily be 
confusing and ineffective, unless due attention is paid to the need to adapt certain 
institutions of one system to the legal tradition of the other system.   
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